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abstraCt
I denne artikel evaluerer forfatteren, hvorvidt de juridiske rammer for udviklin-
gen af personlig medicin i Danmark kan legitimeres som en form for solidaritet. 
Artiklen har fokus på de seneste ændringer af Sundhedsloven, der opretter 
Nationalt Genom Centre. Artiklen når frem til, at nogle bestemmelser i loven 
ikke er forankret i patientens selvbestemmelsesret, da biologisk materiale i 
nogle tilfælde kan opbevares og bruges til forskning uden informeret samtykke. 
For at evaluere hvorvidt denne praksis kan forklares som en form for solidaritet, 
gør forfatteren brug af Prainsack og Buyx beskrivelse af solidaritet, hvilken 
påstår, at solidaritet kræver gennemsigtighed, sandfærdighed og at patienter 
beskyttes mod negative konsekvenser.
Baseret på denne analyse argumenteres der for, at den nuværende lov ikke 
kan betragtes som en form for solidaritet, fordi patienterne ikke bliver til-
strækkelig informeret om, at formodet samtykke finder anvendelse i det danske 
sundhedsvæsen. Det findes også kritisabelt, at børn og voksne uden evne til at 
give samtykke er omfattede af modellen for formodet samtykke. Derfor anbe-
fales det, at alle patienter bliver bedre informerede om, at biologisk materiale 
i nogle tilfælde kan opbevares og bruges til forskning og at børns rettigheder i 
forbindelse med omfattende genom-undersøgelse sættes i fokus.
* This research is supported by the Carlsberg Foundation (meinwe.ku.dk). Thank you 
to my colleagues in the MeinWe project for their comments on an earlier draft, in 
particular, Professor Mette Harlev, LLD.
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1. Introduction
… We must recognize that not all medicine works on the individual patient. 
People with, for example, arthritis or cancer may find that they have to go through 
many different treatments or experience many side effects. There are also diseases 
which we do not know the cause of and which are therefore difficult to treat.
It does not have to be this way in the future.
With Personalised Medicine, we can develop new treatments through the use 
of knowledge and new technologies. Using genetic knowledge about the disease 
and the individual patient’s characteristics, we can diagnose diseases better and 
target treatment to a greater extent…1
Inspired by discreet successes, a growing number of governments seek 
to advance personalised medicine through adopting political strategies 
designed to stimulate use of genetic data in healthcare.2 Personalised 
medicine uses genomic data, combined with other forms of big data, to 
stratify patients and develop individualised treatments. The proposed 
benefits include saving lives and avoiding side effects, while reducing 
healthcare costs.3 Through advances in genome sequencing, it is possi-
ble to identify whether an individual carries an increased risk of certain 
breast and colon cancers, or whether a patient can expect to benefit from 
specific cancer drugs. Using this knowledge, patients can, in some cases, 
avail of more effective, tailored prevention and treatment.4 At the same 
time, the literature highlights several legal concerns, including, limita-
tions of informed consent, misuse of data by third parties, genetic dis-
crimination, privacy, incidental findings, confidentiality among genetic 
relatives, and equitable access to treatment.5 This raises the question, 
1 Sundheds-og Ældreministeriet, Personlig Medicin til Gavn for Patienterne: National 
Strategi for Personlig Medicin 2017–2020, Denmark, 2016, p. 3.
2 For a succinct overview of personalised medicine in Europe, see Nimmesgern, E., 
Benediktsson, I., & Norstedt, I., Personalized Medicine in Europe, Clinical and 
translational science, Vol. 10, Nr. 2, p. 61–63, 2017.
3 Dzau VJ, Ginsburg GS, Van Nuys K, Agus D, Goldman D, Aligning incentives to 
fulfil the promise of personalised medicine, Lancet. Vol. 385(9982), pp. 2118–9, 2015.
4 Hong K., Oh B., Overview of personalized medicine in the disease genomic era, BMB 
Rep. Vol. 43, Nr. 10, p. 643–8, 2010.
5 See, for example, Brothers, KB., Rothstein, MA., Ethical, legal and social implications 
of incorporating personalized medicine in healthcare, Per. Med. Vol 12, Nr. 1, 
pp. 43–51, 2015, p. 46; McClellan, K. A., Avard, D., Simard, J., & Knoppers, B. M., 
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can governments promote access to patient data in the name of good 
population health, while simultaneously respecting patients’ legal rights?
In the field of healthcare, law plays an important role in negotiat-
ing the balance between individual rights and collective interests. Law 
codifies rights, like respect for private life and protection of personal 
data, and provides for remedies where violations occur.6 Law safeguards 
individual autonomy through requiring consent to treatment and shar-
ing of confidential information.7 Furthermore, legislation can protect 
patients from negative consequences of receiving treatment, such as 
discrimination based on genetics, as well as exclusion from access to 
healthcare. Yet, law also recognises the individual and collective as inev-
itably intertwined.8 Indeed, the interests of the collective may sometimes 
outweigh the rights of the individual; for instance, protection of health 
is a legitimate aim under the European Convention on Human Rights.9 
The interplay between the collective and individual in law is ever shifting 
and challenged by developments in genomics.
Against this backdrop, this article investigates provisions of the Dan-
ish Health Act (Sundhedsloven), including recent amendments intended 
to support personalised medicine.10 Denmark is selected as a case study 
as the government has begun to implement personalised medicine in 
mainstream healthcare, including adopting a national strategy and 
enacting legislation inter alia establishing a National Genome Centre. 
Personalized medicine and access to health care: potential for inequitable access?. 
European journal of human genetics, Vol. 21, Nr. 2, pp. 143–147, 2013.
6 For example, European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, Articles 7, 8, 47.
7 For example, Bekendtgørelse af sundhedsloven nr 1286, 2 November 2018, § 15, § 41.
8 Nedelsky argues that the idea of autonomy as in opposition to the collective is 
distorted. Instead, liberal rights should be transformed through a relational approach. 
Nedelsky, J. Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law, 
Oxford University Press. Oxford, 2011 p. 53, 73.
9 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 ETS 5, 1950, Article 
8.
10 For a thorough analysis of Danish law in the context of personalized medicine, see: 
Mette Hartlev & Katharina Ó Cathaoir, Lovgivning – realiteter og udfordringer in 
Personlig medicin – filosofiske og tværvidenskabelige perspektiver, (Eds.) Klausen, 
SH., & Christiansen, K. (Munksgaard Forlag, forthcoming).
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I argue that, despite the Ministry of Health’s claims to the contrary, 
self-determination is not the dominant ethical basis underlying selected 
provisions of the Health Act. Instead, the law pursues collective interests 
by permitting reuse of biological samples for research without patients’ 
informed consent. In response, I evaluate whether the legislation could 
instead be reframed as an act of solidarity.
As solidarity has (justifiably) been criticised as vague and lacking a 
unifying theory, I rely on the work of Prainsack and Buyx, who define 
solidarity as:
Enacted commitments to carry ‘costs’ (financial, social, emotional or otherwise) 
to assist others with whom a person or persons recognise similarity in a relevant 
respect.11
Prainsack and Buyx’s model is chosen for its comprehensiveness (it is 
based on an extensive literature review) and for its proximity to the topic 
of this paper (the authors’ model was designed for application in bioeth-
ics, specifically personalised medicine and health databases). While sol-
idarity is frequently drawn upon in bioethics, no other approaches were 
found that offered the same transparency and traceability in terms of 
what solidarity in bioethics might require (see further section 3). Prain-
sack and Buyx further approach solidarity as an enacted practice (distinct 
from a normative idea or sentiment), which renders their approach well 
suited to an analysis of legislation.12
In evaluating the appropriateness of Danish legislation, I also draw 
on international legal norms codified in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, European Convention on Biomedicine and the Genetic 
Testing Protocol to the Biomedicine Convention, as well as non-binding 
recommendations and declarations.13 To expose the intentions behind the 
11 Prainsack B., Buyx, A., Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond. Cambridge University 
Press United Kingdom, 2017, p. 52.
12 Ibid., p. 45.
13 Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Con-
vention on Human Rights and Biomedicine ETS No. 164, 1997; Council of Europe, 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine con-
cerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes CETS No. 203, 2008; United Nations 
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law, I include parliamentary debates, such as, parliamentary questions 
and responses from the Department of Health. Policy documents like 
the government’s strategy on personalised medicine are also studied.14
Section 1 presents the core steps that Denmark has taken to intro-
duce personalised medicine into healthcare. In Section 2, I demonstrate 
that self-determination expressed through informed consent does 
not underlie the current legislative landscape. Section 3 suggests that 
Danish healthcare could instead provide an example of solidarity-based 
personalised medicine, given the communitarian and trust-based nature 
of the Danish welfare state. To evaluate whether solidarity-based gov-
ernance is applicable, I then analyse whether the legislation conforms 
to conditions suggested by Prainsack and Buyx, namely whether there 
is transparency, and whether legislation protects patient privacy and 
prohibits discrimination. Concluding that Danish legislation does not 
live up to the solidarity model, section 4 makes recommendations for 
how the legislation could be reformed. Finally, I reflect on the position 
of the minority patient in solidarity-based governance.
2. Personalised Medicine in Denmark  
– the Story so Far
Denmark has taken several key steps to introduce personalised med-
icine into clinical care, including pledging 100 million kroner (circa 
13.4 million euro) in funding.15 In 2015, the Danish Regions, together 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, The Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997. As the Genetic Testing Protocol is a 
specific legal instrument drafted by states, it is drawn on as best practice for identify-
ing relevant rights. However, Denmark cannot be held in breach of its provisions as it 
has neither ratified nor signed the Protocol. Further, the Protocol is only applicable to 
treatment, not research.
14 The legislation establishing the Danish National Genome Centre is not a standalone 
Act, but amends the Health Act. Therefore, although the primary focus of this article 
is on the specific amendments, the Act is read as a whole.
15 10 million kroner was set aside in 2017, and 30 million a year in 2018–2020 
(Finansministeriet, Finanslov for finansåret 2017: tekst og anmærkninger, p. 37). In 
2018, following an application from the state, Novo Nordisk Foundation granted 
990 million crowns (133 million euro) for establishing and operating the National 
Genome Centre.
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with universities and a patient organisation, published an Action Plan 
for Personalised Medicine, with plans to offer genome sequencing to 
100,000 Danes.16 The Action Plan also called for the establishment of 
a national genome bank. Shortly after, in 2016, the Ministry of Health 
released its National Strategy for Personalised Medicine, making the 
case that this emerging health technology will benefit patients and soci-
ety.17 Personalised medicine, it is claimed, will lead to more targeted 
monitoring and prevention, more effective diagnosis and treatment, and 
better opportunities to improve patient health.18 Like the Action Plan, 
the Strategy proposed the establishment of a National Genome Centre 
as a central pillar of personalised medicine.19
In September 2017, the government released a draft text of an amend-
ment to the Danish Health Act which proposed to introduce legislative 
changes necessary to realise the national infrastructure proposed in the 
Strategy.20 In response to criticisms, in February 2018, the government 
made changes and released the final text of the bill.21 After tense debate, 
the amendments to the Health Act were adopted in July 2018. Further 
to powers delegated in the amendment, the Minister for Health issued 
secondary legislation in February 2019.22
Through the 2018 amendment, the government aims to provide the 
structures necessary for increased use of genetic data in treatment. The 
amendment establishes a National Genome Centre under the Ministry 
for Health with the purpose of developing a nationwide infrastructure 
for the retrieval and storage of genetic information, including a national 
16 Danske Regioner, Handlingsplan for Personlig Medicin, 2015, p. 6. In Denmark, the 
regions are responsible for treatment and prevention. Sundhedsloven, § 3.
17 Strategy, see note 1.
18 Ibid., p. 6.
19 Ibid., p. 22–23.
20 Forslag til Loven om ændring af sundhedsloven Sundheds- og Ældreudvalget 
2016–17 SUU Alm.del Bilag 470, 2017.
21 Folketinget, Forslag til Loven om ændring af sundhedsloven, L 146, 9 February 2018.
22 Sundheds-og Ældreministeriet, Høring over udkast til bekendtgørelser på Sund-
heds- og Ældreministeriets område – oprettelse af Nationalt Genom Center mv., 4 
February 2019; BEK nr 360 af 04/04/2019, BEK nr 359 af 04/04/2019, BEK nr 361 af 
04/04/2019, BEK nr 355 af 04/04/2019.
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genome database for clinical and research use.23 According to the leg-
islature, using legislation to establish the National Genome Centre 
strengthens security and transparency when processing personal data.24 
The amendment also gives the Minister for Health the power to create 
rules requiring certain health institutions and healthcare workers, both 
public and private, to transfer genetic information derived from biological 
material, and health information, to the National Genome Centre.25 This 
means that, from the 1st of July 2019, all dry genetic data derived from 
genome sequencing in healthcare must be transferred in the Genome 
Centre. Bekendtgørelse om Nationalt Genom Centers indsamling af 
genetiske oplysninger, nr 360, § 2, stk 1. 
Despite near unanimous political support, the law-making process 
proved contentious. Both the 2017 draft bill and the 2018 bill drew sus-
tained criticism in the media, with organisations like the Danish Institute 
for Human Rights concerned that the amendment could interfere with 
the right to private life.26 While many organisations expressed support for 
the bill, several noted that certain provisions were unclear and exposed 
the individual to risks.27 As a result of the criticisms, the government 
made several amendments, altering the originally intended scope of the 
bill. During the law-making process, 77 questions were submitted by 
23 Lov om ændring af sundhedsloven, nr. 728 af 8. juni 2018 (Organiseringen i Sund-
heds- og Ældreministeriet, oprettelse af Nationalt Genomcenter m.v.), chapter 68.
24 Regeringen (Venstre, Liberal Alliance, Det Konservative Folkeparti) 
Socialdemokratiet Dansk Folkeparti Alternativet Radikale Venstre Socialistisk 
Folkeparti, Politisk aftale om Forslag til Lov om ændring af sundhedsloven (Organise-
ringen i Sundheds- og Ældreministeriet, oprettelse af Nationalt Genom Center m.v.), 
22 Jan 2018.
25 Sundhedsloven, § 223a.
26 Lindblad, L., Kommende dna-center skaber bekymring: ”Det opløser retten til 
privatliv”, Politiken, 21 oct 2017; Beich, A., Birk Kristiansen, T, Pas på: Big Brother 
nærmer sig. State vil stjæle dine dna-oplysninger, Politiken, 2 Nov 2017, Straka,R., 
Stryhn Kjeldtoft, S., Politikere undrer sig: Rigspolitiet får adgang til dna-center, 
Politiken, 26 Feb 2018; Straka, R, Stryhn Kjeldtoft, S, Kritik: DNA-projekt er 
højrisikabelt for hele den danske befolkning, Politiken, 25 Feb 2018; Straka R, 
National genbank skal opdage fremtidens medicin, Politiken, 26 Feb 2018.
27 For example, Det Etiske Råd, Vedr. Det Etiske Råd besvarelse af høring over udkast til 
forslag til lov om ændring af sundhedsloven, 12 oktober 2017; Forbrugerrådet Tænk, 
høring over udkast til forslag til lov om ændring af sundhedsloven 16 oktober 2017.
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organisations and politicians, concerning inter alia access to the data, 
self-determination and data security.28
The intense debate may be attributed to several factors. For one, the 
Bill was proposed while data security was under scrutiny, due to the 
entry into force of the European Union General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR), and because of a series of data breaches in Denmark. For 
instance, in 2015, the State Serum Institute sent a CD with unencrypted 
data relating to 5.3 million Danes’ health to the Chinese Visa Application 
Centre, instead of the Danish Statistics Office.29 Another basis for con-
cern appears to be the perceived special nature of genetic data, known 
as genetic exceptionalism. Some feared that citizens’ genomes would 
be sequenced without their consent, and that adequate safeguards were 
not in place. For instance, in 2018, it emerged that blood samples from 
86,000 Danes were being stored in the USA to be used in a research 
project on psychiatric illnesses, without the Danish researchers securing 
the oversight required by law.30
The amendment, as adopted, reflects a form of genetic exceptionalism, 
whereby genetic data is governed differently to biological samples and 
other classes of health data. While the amendment increases patient 
self-determination when it comes to genetic data, it can be questioned 
whether informed consent is adequately protected in Danish health law, 
as discussed in the next section.
3. When Treatment becomes Research
While the amendment introduces several legislative changes, this arti-
cle focuses on the reuse of biological samples without consent, which 
came to the fore during the debates on the National Genome Centre. In 
response, the government took certain steps to increase patients’ self-de-
termination. Yet, the amendment does not fully resolve the shortcomings 
that were previously in force and thereby continues to fall short of inter-
28 L 146, spørgsmål 1-77.
29 Data Tilsynet, ’Anbefalet brev afleveret til en forkert modtager’. 15-07-2016. Journal-
nummer: 2015-321-0307.
30 Stryhn Kjeldtoft, S, 86.000 danskeres dna opbevares ulovligt i USA, Politiken, 10 
March 2018.
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national norms. This is primarily because users of Danish healthcare can 
still become – what I term – “incidental research subjects”, whereby the 
act of consenting to treatment can result in a patient’s biological samples 
being sequenced for research. Below I explain the process by which this 
can occur and argue that the right to informed consent is not adequately 
safeguarded.
In clinical practice, biological samples are routinely gathered as part 
of diagnosis and treatment. In Denmark, the samples are often subse-
quently stored in local or national biobanks, and can be retrieved should 
the patient’s treatment require.31 In some cases, there is a system in place 
for informing patients of this process. For example, when parents consent 
to new-born screening for congenital diseases, such as phenylketonuria 
(PKU), they are given an information leaflet which explains that leftover 
samples are stored in the Neonatal Screening Bank (commonly called 
PKU Bank).32 In contrast, when a patient has a biopsy performed at 
a hospital or a blood sample taken at a doctor’s office, their sample is 
sometimes stored in a biobank without this being explained. Unknown 
to many is that these samples may also leave the confines of the clinic and 
move into the research world; in other words, samples are in some cases 
processed for purposes beyond patient treatment. The Danish Health Act 
allows for biological samples to be given to researchers without obtaining 
patient consent in connection with approved research projects.33 This 
creates a parallel system to the usual requirement that researchers must 
obtain written informed consent before commencing research using 
biological samples.34 Researchers apply to use patient samples in a range 
of research projects and, increasingly, perform genetic analyses on the 
samples, including whole genome sequencing.35
31 See further, Danish Council of Ethics, Research with health data and biological 
material in Denmark, 2015.
32 Statens Serum Institut, Til Forældrene: Blod Prøve fra Nyfødte, 13. udgave, Køben-
havn, 2017.
33 Sundhedsloven, § 32.
34 Bekendtgørelse af lov om videnskabsetisk behandling af sundhedsvidenskabelige 
forskningsprojekter (Komitéloven), nr 1083, 15 September 2017, § 3.
35 See further, Danish Council of Ethics, note 31; Nørgaard-Pedersen, B. & Hougaard, 
DM., Storage policies and use of the Danish Newborn Screening Biobank, Journal of 
Inherited Metabolic Disease, Vol. 30, Nr. 4, pp. 530–536, 2007.
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Users of the Danish healthcare system can however, avoid becoming 
incidental research subjects. Persons over 15 years can register, online or 
in writing, in The Tissue Usage Register (Vævsanvendelsesregisteret). Once 
registered, biological material gathered for treatment may only be used 
for the patient’s treatment, and purposes connected to it.36 The phrasing 
of the legislation is paradoxical: it asserts the patient’s right to limit how 
her samples are used, albeit subject to an obligation to take steps to enjoy 
the entitlement. Otherwise, consent to research is assumed.37 The 2018 
Amendment expands this system as it also allows patients to opt out of 
research using their “dry” genetic data (not just their biological samples 
as before).38
During the debates on the 2018 amendment, following criticisms, 
the Ministry for Health sought to equate the process of giving informed 
consent to treatment to also consenting to contribute to research. The 
Ministry repeatedly claimed, in response to questions, that the legislation 
enshrines informed and full consent.39 Yet, this model more accurately 
represents presumed consent, which does not conform to the interna-
tionally recognised elements of informed consent, in particular the right 
to information and freedom to consent.
First, in terms of information, patients are not routinely informed 
that their samples may be stored and re-used for research. Clearly, when 
a patient consents to treatment, they do not (also) give consent to future 
use for research purposes, where no efforts have been made to inform 
them of the possibility. Subsequent to powers delegated in the 2018 
amendment, the Minister for Health has introduced secondary legisla-
tion requiring that consent to treatment involving genetic analysis must 
be given in writing. The consent form informs the patient that her data 
can be stored in the Genome Centre and that she must opt out to avoid 
36 Sundhedsloven, § 29 (emphasis added). Connected purposes include quality control, 
developing methods, teaching healthcare workers and other routine functions with a 
direct connection with the treatment.
37 Bekendtgørelse om Vævsanvendelsesregisteret nr 966, 22 September 2004.
38 Sundhedsloven, § 29(4).
39 See for example, Sundheds- og Ældreudvalget 2017–18 L 146 endeligt svar på 
spørgsmål 1, p. 2.
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re-use.40 Yet, this consent form is only used if the patient is undergoing 
genetic analysis, meaning the non-information paradigm prevails for 
patients having other forms of treatment. Furthermore, while this is a 
step towards greater transparency, the information provided is limited 
compared to that given to persons enrolled in research projects; the 
treating health professional will not be able to tell the patient whether 
their data will be used, or in connection with which research projects, 
and which results the samples may yield.
Second, it is debatable whether the consent given in such situations is 
free. Several factors undermine the essence of freedom. When consenting 
to genetic analysis, patients must agree to their data being stored in the 
Genome Centre and can only opt-out of re-use. This runs contrary to a 
non-binding recommendation of the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers, which states that refusal to consent to storage of biological 
materials should not lead to discrimination regarding the right to medical 
care.41 Furthermore, through the opt-out, the legislation presents “yes” 
as the default, while “no” is the exception. The patient remains obligated 
to act to avoid future use of her samples, which requires motivation. She 
is thereby nudged to consent, as the latter has been framed by the health-
care system as the preferred “choice”.42 The reuse of biological samples 
for research may be desirable or justifiable in the interests of society, but 
that does not mean that presumed consent is tantamount to free consent.
Thus, despite the claims of the Ministry for Health, I conclude that 
patients do not give informed consent to re-use of biological samples in 
line with international standards. Instead, this patient group is more accu-
rately categorised as incidental research subjects. At the same time, this 
does not automatically render the legislation illegitimate. For instance, 
40 Bekendtgørelse om information og samtykke i forbindelse med behandling og ved 
videregivelse og indhentning af helbredsoplysninger m.v nr 359, 4 April 2019, § 2, 
stk 5; Nationalt Genom Center, Informeret samtykke til omfattende genetisk analyse 
som led i din behandling (2019). 
41 Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on research on biological materials of human origin (Adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 11 May 2016 at the 1256th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), 
Article 5.2.
42 See further, Asmussen, IH. & Ó Cathaoir, KE., Making Access to a Population of 
Bodies in the Name of Autonomy, European Journal of Health Law, Vol. 25, Nr. 5, 
pp. 555–572, 2018.
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although different ethical issues apply (for one, the patient is deceased), 
presumed consent is used in organ donation in several countries.43 Still, 
the current approach is problematic as the government seeks to rely on 
self-determination as an ethical basis. Therefore, in the next section, I 
explore whether the presumed consent model could be reframed as an 
act of solidarity, which justifies limiting self-determination.
4. A State of Solidarity
Solidarity is a timely principle to draw upon in light of a growing dis-
course on its role within health law and genetics.44 Already more than a 
decade ago, Knoppers and Chadwick argued that, in genetics, individu-
alism rooted in autonomy and privacy was giving way to communitari-
anism in the form of solidarity.45 Although the Danish legislation was not 
enacted with express reliance on solidarity, could it be reconceptualised 
(and thereby legitimised) as a form of solidarity-based governance? As 
a welfare state with a high level of public trust in institutions, Denmark 
seems to offer appropriate conditions for solidarity-based personalised 
medicine.
Several factors suggest that the Danish healthcare system may be 
suited to solidarity-based governance. The country is a welfare state 
characterised by a communitarian ideology: the individual forms part 
of a larger collective.46 Crucially, research suggests that citizens view 
public institutions as “trustworthy partners”, heavily relied upon to per-
43 Rudge, CJ, Organ donation: opting in or opting out? Br J Gen Pract Vol. 68 (667), 
pp. 62–63, 2018.
44 Recourse to solidarity is increasing generally in public and academic discourse 
(Prainsack & Buyx, p. 6). In contrast, Rose suggests that increasing “personalization” 
may challenge solidarity, Rose, N., Personalized Medicine: Promises Problems and 
Perils of a New Paradigm for Healthcare, Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Vol. 77, pp. 341–352, 2013, p. 350.
45 Knoppers, BM, Chadwick, R., Human genetic research: emerging trends in ethics, 
Nature Reviews Vol. 6, Nr. 1, pp. 75–9, 2005. See also, Chadwick, R., Berg, K., 
Solidarity and equity: new ethical frameworks for genetic databases, Nature, Vol. 2, 
Nr. 4, pp. 318–21, 2001.
46 Svendsen, MN., The Social Life of Genetic Knowledge: A Case-study of Choices 
and Dilemmas in Cancer Genetic Counselling in Denmark, Medical Anthropology 
Vol. 25, Nr. 2, pp. 139–170, 2006, p. 141.
nst 21–22.2019
In Search of Solidarity  • 77
form important social functions, including healthcare.47 Social trust and 
trust in institutions is therefore high; corruption is low.48 Furthermore, 
the Danish welfare model is grounded in universalism: generous social 
benefits are funded through taxation and are available to residents – 
not only citizens.49 Finally, Denmark boasts an advanced technological 
infrastructure; all residents are registered on the central person register 
(CPR), which enables linking demographic data with health and educa-
tion data.50 Through the CPR, the 25.3 million samples from 5.7 million 
people currently found in the Danish Biobank Register, can be linked 
to disease codes and demographic details from registers.51 Therefore, a 
unified health infrastructure that offers tangible social benefits, coupled 
with high levels of trust and reliance on public institutions, may create 
conditions that encourage and incentivise patients to contribute, for 
instance, biological samples to further the development of personalised 
medicine.
At the same time, the Danish welfare state model, and the health-
care system, is under increasing strain. Longer life expectancy and low 
birth rate contribute to an ageing population.52 While immigration has 
historically been low in Denmark, globalisation and EU enlargement is 
shifting demographics, and fostering xenophobia. Rapid developments 
47 Svendsen, MN., Navne, LE, Gjødsbøl, IM., Dam, MS., A life worth living: Temporal-
ity, care, and personhood in the Danish welfare state, American Ethnologist, Vol. 45, 
Nr. 1, pp. 20–3, 2018, p. 23.
48 Lind Haase Svendsen, G., Tinggaard Svendsen G., Graeff P., Explaining the Emer-
gence of Social Trust: Denmark and Germany, Historical Social Research Vol. 37, 
No. 3 (141), Controversies around the Digital Humanities, pp. 351–367, 2012.
49 Hartlev, M., The raison d’etre of Nordic Health Law, in Rynning E. & Hartlev M., 
(Ed.) Nordic Health Law in a European Context – Welfare State Perspectives on 
Patients’ Rights and Biomedicine, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, p. 54. See 
further, Ministry of Health, Healthcare in Denmark – an Overview, Ministry of 
Health, 2017, available at https://www.sum.dk/English/~/media/Filer%20-%20
Publikationer_i_pdf/2016/Healthcare-in-dk-16-dec/Healthcare-english-V16-dec.ashx.
50 Bekendtgørelse af lov om Det Centrale Personregister nr 646 2 June 2017 (CPR-
Loven). The register stores information such as name, address, gender.
51 Danmarks Nationale Biobank, The Danish Biobank Register, www.danishnationalbi-
obank.com/danish-biobank-register (23 May 2019).
52 Møller Pedersen, K., Bech, M., Vrangbæk, K., The Danish Health Care System: 
An Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. Copenhagen 
Consensus Center. https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/Con-
sensusReportDanishHealth_final.pdf.
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in technology, while promising, are expensive for a small welfare state 
to guarantee for all residents. In light of these pressures, the prospect of 
cost-effective healthcare technology is attractive.
In the coming sections, I analyse whether the Danish consent model 
could be justified as a form of solidarity-based governance, drawing on 
Prainsack and Buyx’s model. Their approach to solidarity stipulates that 
the individual accepts some cost to assist others (not merely herself). In 
terms of cost, in the current example, the patient’s sample is stored and 
potentially reused for research. The relevant similarity may be suffering 
from an illness or simply being a user of the publicly funded healthcare 
system. Therefore, the Danish legislation seems to fall within what Prain-
sack and Buyx classify as solidarity.
In their chapter on governing health databases, Prainsack and Buyx 
detail further conditions that should exist for a database to be suitable 
for solidarity-based governance: people should knowingly contribute, 
the database should create social value and offer appropriate incentives.53 
These conditions should ensure that the costs placed on the individual 
are reasonable and avoid individuals being “left alone when they suffer 
actual harm”.54 In this article, I assume that the data creates a social value 
as it does not primarily serve commercial interests.55 Accordingly, in the 
next section, I evaluate whether the legislation in Denmark provides 
for transparency through ensuring patients are aware that they are con-
tributing data for health-related research.56 Following this discussion, I 
focus on whether the costs are acceptable, namely whether patients are 
adequately protected from discrimination and privacy violations.
4.1. In the Dark
According to Prainsack and Buyx, for governance to be driven by sol-
idarity, the individual must willingly contribute to a common goal and 
thereby realise that they are accepting some costs, beyond their own 
53 Prainsack & Buyx, note 11, p. 106.
54 Ibid., p. 170.
55 Ibid., p. 102–105.
56 Ibid., p. 102–103.
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interests.57 Those contributing to solidarity-based governance must be 
aware that they are doing so and know how their data will be used.58 
This requires “minimum levels of transparency” and veracity about what 
costs the patient may incur.59 Prainsack and Buyx further posit that “data 
donors” should be treated as “information equals”, which requires that 
individuals are supported “in making meaningful decisions”.60 In their 
discussion of presumed consent to organ donation, Prainsack and Buyx 
state that opt-ins only foster solidarity if “people are truly aware of con-
sent being presumed.”61
The Danish approach is immediately challenging in light of this 
requirement. For the Danish model to amount to solidarity-based gov-
ernance, patients must be aware that presumed consent is enshrined in 
law, know that they are contributing to research, and know that they 
have the option to opt out.62 Yet, the new information requirement 
included in the 2018 amendment only applies where the patient gives 
consent to a genetic analysis, meaning that patients who have biopsies 
or other samples taken will (as before) not be informed of the Register, 
even though approved research projects often carry out whole genome 
sequencing of samples.63
Furthermore, if solidarity requires willingness to contribute, the 
position of persons who do not have legal capacity to consent is also 
problematic. Firstly, in the case of children, until they reach age 15, par-
ents or guardians consent to treatment, including genetic analysis, on 
their behalf.64 Likewise, only parents or guardians can register minors/ 
persons without capacity on the Tissue Usage Register.65 The result is 
that by the time a child reaches 15 years and has legal capacity to opt-out, 
her genome may already have been sequenced because her parents have 
57 Ibid., p. 104.
58 Ibid., p. 174.
59 Ibid., p. 103.
60 Ibid., p. 111.
61 Ibid., p. 164.
62 Ibid., p. 164.
63 Nørgaard-Pedersen, B. & Hougaard, DM., note 35.
64 Sundhedsloven, § 17(1).
65 Sundhedsloven, § 18.
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consented to genetic analysis. Likewise, subject to safeguards discussed 
in section 3.3, a child’s genome could be sequenced from samples stored 
in the PKU bank without the child’s knowledge or consent, but based on 
the consent of their parents, given in the first (sometimes chaotic) days of 
life. This can run contrary to the spirit of Genetic Testing Protocol, which 
states that genetic testing must be deferred until the child has capacity to 
consent, unless delay would be detrimental for her health or well-being.66
Danish legislation also fails to adequately enshrine the rights of per-
sons with disabilities. Provided a family member, guardian or an indi-
vidual with power of attorney consents, genetic analysis may be carried 
out on a person who cannot consent. Similarly, samples can be reused for 
research unless the substituted decision maker opts out on the patient’s 
behalf.67 Contrary to Article 9 of the Biomedicine Convention, no provi-
sion is made under Danish law for the individual’s wishes to be taken into 
account in this context, should she lose decision-making capacity in the 
future (although one’s opt-out while competent under the Tissue Usage 
Registry would remain valid). This is not in keeping with the spirit of 
Article 12.5 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
which requires that states take “appropriate and effective measures” to 
ensure that persons with disabilities have equal protection – a provision 
generally interpreted to include advance care directives.68
By including children and persons who cannot consent, the presumed 
consent model runs contrary to the solidarity approach suggested by 
Prainsack and Buyx. The current model potentially automatically enrols 
patients – who cannot opt out, and who are wholly reliant on others 
to do so – in research projects. All persons have rights to privacy and 
self-determination. Therefore, children and persons with disabilities 
should participate in decisions related to genetic sequencing and opting 
out. In reflection of this, Danish law requires that persons who cannot 
consent are informed and included in treatment discussions. However, 
the effectiveness of the provision is dampened by a paternalistic excep-
66 Genetic Testing Protocol, see note 9, Article 10.
67 Sundhedsloven, § 18.
68 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 
December 2006, A/RES/61/106, Annex I.
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tion, whereby persons who cannot consent should only be included in 
so far as inclusion does not harm them.69
Based on this analysis, the current legislation does not meet the 
transparency requirements of solidarity-based governance. Patients are 
inconsistently informed of the potential re-use of their biological sam-
ples and the ability to opt out. Furthermore, patients without capacity 
to consent are included in the opt-out system, even though they cannot 
willingly choose to participate. In section 4, I will consider whether these 
barriers to solidarity-based governance can be remedied.
4.2. Protection from Genetic Discrimination
Solidarity-based governance also requires that the state protects patients 
from harmful consequences. Genetic discrimination is of particular con-
cern in personalised medicine given its potentially widespread implica-
tions in multiple contexts, from access to insurance to criminal law.70 
From a societal standpoint, genetic discrimination is undesirable for 
pragmatic reasons: fear of genetic discrimination could inhibit individ-
uals from participating in research,71 while patients may be discouraged 
from undergoing genetic sequencing for fear of negative implications 
for themselves and their families.72 Genetic discrimination furthermore 
runs counter to international human rights law, namely, the prohibition 
of discrimination based on “other grounds”.73 This section assesses the 
extent to which Danish law protects patients from genetic discrimination.
69 Sundhedsloven, § 20.
70 Wong, SHY., et al., From Personalized Medicine to Personalized Justice: The Prom-
ises of Translational Pharmacogenomics in the Justice System, Pharmacogenomics 
Vol. 11, Nr. 6, pp. 731–7, 2010.
71 Feldman, EA., The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (Gina): Public Policy 
and Medical Practice in the Age of Personalized Medicine, Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, Vol. 27, Nr. 6, pp. 743–6, 2012.
72 Bottinger, EP., Foundations, Promises and Uncertainties of Personalized Medicine, 
Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine: A Journal of Translational and Personalized 
Medicine, Vol. 74, Nr. 1, pp. 15–21, 2007.
73 See further, de Paor A., Genetics, Disability and the Law: Towards an EU Legal 
Framework, Cambridge Disability Law and Policy Series, Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom, 2017.
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Danish law provides for important protections from genetic discrim-
ination in the fields of insurance, pensions and employment. Firstly, 
legislation prohibits use of predictive genetic information (information 
that explains a person’s genes, or risk of developing or incurring dis-
eases) in insurance and pensions assessments.74 An insurance company is 
only entitled to request, obtain or receive and use information that may 
clarify a person’s current or previous state of health.75 Additionally, since 
2016, insurance companies cannot receive, obtain or request information 
relating to the health of others, including information about relatives’ 
health.76 The basis for the amendment was that families often lack com-
plete information about their relatives’ health. Further, information on 
familial risk is not a reliable prediction of future risk.77 This provision 
is furthermore in line with the recommendation from the Council of 
Europe, which advises that family members’ genetic tests should not be 
processed for insurance purposes.78
Likewise, an employer may not apply for, obtain, or receive and use 
health information for clarifying an employee’s risk of developing dis-
eases.79 The employer should not seek information on familial health or 
initiate investigations with a view to determining whether an individual 
has a propensity for a genetic disease.80 The employer may only request 
health information (including information from genetic analyses) for the 
purpose of clarifying whether the employee has a disease or has or had 
symptoms of a disease, where the disease will have a significant impact 
74 Bekendtgørelse af lov om forsikringsaftaler, nr 1237, 12 Nov 2015, § 3; Lov om 
firmapensionskasser nr 1703, 27 December 2018, § 11.
75 Ibid.
76 Lov om ændring af lov om forsikringsaftaler og lov om tilsyn med firmapension-
skasser Nr. 638, 8 June 2016 (Udvidelse af forbud mod indhentelse og anvendelse af 
visse helbredsmæssige oplysninger ved tegning m.v. af forsikringer og pensioner).
77 Betænkning afgivet af Retsudvalget den 19. maj 2016.
78 Recommendation CM/Rec (2016) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to the member 
States on the processing of personal health-related data for insurance purposes, 
including data resulting from genetic tests (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 26 October 2016 at the 1269th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), para. 17.
79 Lov om brug af helbredsoplysninger m.v. på arbejdsmarkedet, nr. 286, 24 april 1996, 
§ 2(2).
80 Ibid., § 1(3).
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on the employee’s ability to carry out their work.81 As de Paor notes, 
discrimination on grounds of genetic features may also be contrary to 
the prohibition of discrimination under the EU Charter, which should 
inform the interpretation of EU legislation, such as the Employment 
Equality Directive.82
The European legal landscape governing genetic discrimination is 
fragmented, with no standard for what adequate protection requires.83 
Danish patients enjoy certain protections from discrimination in insur-
ance, employment and pensions, should it come to light that they bear a 
mutation that indicates a disease risk. These protections are important 
given the unreliable nature of some findings. Still, there can be implica-
tions where genetic sequencing shows an individual is currently suffering 
from a previously undiagnosed genetic disease. The boundaries between 
disease risk and disease diagnosis can be fluid. Patients may thereby be 
unsure as to what information they should report to insurers, while case 
assessors in insurance companies or in human resources may struggle to 
make systematic and accurate distinctions, leaving patients vulnerable 
to inconsistent decisions. Unless appealed, these interpretations go on 
behind closed doors, meaning that we know little about how the law is 
implemented in individual cases.
To address latent discrimination risks and boost patient autonomy, 
it may be desirable to provide impartial information on the potential 
insurance implications of undergoing genetic testing, or enrolling in 
research projects involving sequencing. Again, the incidental research 
subject is particularly vulnerable, as she is unaware of her assumed 
consent to research. So far there is no evidence of sequencing based on 
presumed consent leading to incidental findings of such significance that 
the researchers are ethically compelled to inform the research subject.84 
However, if, as predicted, we soon come to better understand the link 
between genetics and disease risk, there may be insurance implications 
81 Ibid., § 2(2).
82 de Paor, see note 73, p. 252.
83 Ibid., p. 259.
84 The National Research Ethics Committee has set guidelines for when incidental 
findings should be reported. National Videnskabsetisk Komité, Vejledning om 
genomforskning, Copenhagen, 1 June 2018, section 5.2.
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for incidental research subjects. These implications are another reason 
why patients must be better informed of their “donations”. Additionally, 
more clarity is needed as to whether genetic discrimination occurs in 
other contexts, such as family law decisions, including adoption, and 
financial decisions, such as access to loans or mortgages.
4.3. Privacy
The principle of transparency further requires an appropriate level of 
foreseeability: the patient should know who will have access to her data 
and under what circumstances. Thus, legislation should limit the actors 
with access to the data according to clear, transparent grounds. In this 
section, I introduce the legal framework governing sharing of genetic 
information and explore under which circumstances genetic data can be 
shared with police.
While the government originally proposed a single, secure infrastruc-
ture for the storage of genetic data, it actually creates the opposite: a 
parallel system. Only dry data will be transferred to and stored in the 
National Genome Centre. Meanwhile, biological samples will continue 
to be stored in various biobanks around the country. Additionally, data 
gathered prior to the legislation entering into force cannot be transferred 
to the Genome Centre unless the patient consents. Biological samples 
will continue to be reused for research, separate to the data held in the 
Genome Centre. Therefore, the proposed simplified system can, if any-
thing, be said to further complicate the legal landscape as different rules 
apply depending on where the data is stored.85
The Danish Data Protection Act, following the GDPR, limits the 
purposes for which personal and health data can be processed, while the 
Health Act also limits the actors who can access health data without 
patient consent.86 For instance, electronic health data can be processed 
for several purposes without patient consent but only by authorised 
85 For an analysis of the law governing research data, see Hartlev, M., Udvalgte love og 
regler for forskning med mennesker in Forskningsmetoder i folkesundhedsvidenskab 
(5. udgave) Eds. Signild Vallgårda og Anja Marie Bornø Jensen (forthcoming).
86 Section 6 (personal data) and 7 (sensitive personal data) of the Danish Data Protec-
tion Act (no. 502 of 23 May 2018).
nst 21–22.2019
In Search of Solidarity  • 85
health professionals.87 Health data and biological samples gathered dur-
ing treatment may be given to a researcher for use in a concrete research 
project, provided certain conditions are met.88 In contrast, data held in 
the National Genome Centre may only be processed for two purposes: 
the treatment of the patient, or for statistical or scientific research of 
significant societal importance.89
Given these broad research exemptions, research ethics committees 
play an important role in protecting privacy. Where ethics approval is 
required, a research ethics committee must ensure that research projects 
do not violate the individual’s right to physical and mental integrity, 
and right to private life.90 The committee assesses the project’s scientific 
standard, and carries out a risk assessment, including an assessment of 
whether the potential risks are acceptable in light of the possible reward.91 
Certain projects can be approved by regional committees, whereas the 
National Research Ethics Committee must approve projects relating to 
particularly complex areas, such as whole genome sequencing of sam-
ples from incidental research subjects.92 This ensures consistency and 
continuity of decision-making. Historically, wet and dry data have been 
governed differently, with biological samples requiring research ethics 
approval, while access to health data from electronic patient records 
for research only required approval from the Danish Patient Safety 
Authority (Styrelsen for Patientsikkerhed).93 However, since June 2018, the 
National Research Ethics Committee has required researchers to seek a 
new research ethics permission if they wish to conduct further research 
on dry genetic data generated from wet data, or if they wish to transmit 
the data to other researchers.94 Currently, a legislative amendment is 
under consideration that will legally require researchers to gain ethics 
87 Sundhedsloven, § 42d.
88 Sundhedsloven, § 32.
89 Sundhedsloven, § 223(b).
90 Komitéloven, § 20(4); Hartlev, M., Hybel, U., Bak Mortensen, Sundhed og Jura, Djøf, 
Denmark, 2017, p. 580.
91 Komitéloven, § 18(3).
92 Komitéloven § 15.
93 Sundhedsloven, § 32; The Patient Safety Authority only provides patient health data 
to research projects of “significant societal interest” (Sundhedsloven, § 46(2)).
94 See note 84, section 7.
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approval to conduct research on sensitive biometric data, including dry 
genomic data.95
While the Health Act specifies the actors that may access general 
health data, the 2018 amendment did not originally specify who may 
access data held in the Genome Centre.96 This led to concerns regarding 
which actors would be able to access genetic information stored in the 
Centre.97 While it is clear from the above discussion that insurance and 
pensions companies and employers cannot access patient data without 
consent, one question was whether police could. During the debates on 
the 2018 amendment, the Minister for Health noted that, in extreme 
situations, special circumstances could provide grounds for granting a 
court order requiring the Genome Centre to give police access to genetic 
data held in the Centre.98 This raised fears – could routine visits to a doc-
tor’s office result in patients unwittingly ending up in police databases 
without proper safeguards?
Based on limited existing case law, it seems that, at present, police will 
only be permitted to access data stored in the Genome Centre (or other 
biobanks) in strictly limited circumstances as, given the special nature 
of genetic information, the right to private life weighs heavily against 
societal interests. For instance, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights has held that the retention of cell samples and 
DNA profiles interferes with the right to respect for private life per se 
given the “nature and amount of personal information”.99 The case 
underscores the European Court’s recognition of the highly personal 
nature of genetic information, and the need for adequate safeguards for 
the individual’s privacy.
The same considerations seem to apply at national level. In a case 
before the Danish courts, the police requested that Statens Serum Institut 
95 Folketinget, Forslag til Lov om ændring af lov om videnskabsetisk behandling 
af sundhedsvidenskabelige forskningsprojekter og sundhedsloven (Styrkelse af 
borgernes tryghed og tillid til sundhedsforskning), L. 193, 28 Feb 2019.
96 See also, Kent Kristensen, Notat: Lov om Nationalt Genom Center, February 2018.
97 See, for example note 22.
98 Sundheds- og Ældreudvalget 2017–18 L 146, Spørgsmål 34, 28. februar 2018, 
available at http://www.ft.dk/samling/20171/lovforslag/L146/spm/34/1861444/index.
htm.
99 S and Marper v. the United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581, para 73.
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(SSI) locate and provide a sample held in the PKU bank in connection 
with a murder investigation.100 On appeal, the Eastern High Court 
denied the application, finding that the provisions of civil process were 
not fulfilled. The Court held that the individual’s sample could not be 
seized, as the action was not proportionate in light of the significance 
of the case and the harm that the measure may be expected to cause the 
individual. The decision focuses on the fact that the sample had been pro-
vided for screening of neonatal diseases. Samples gathered for neonatal 
screening could be retained for 50 years and indefinitely, if anonymized, 
while samples collected under the DNA register law may only be retained 
for 10 years.101 If a sample from the PKU bank could be delivered to the 
police forty years after collection, but not under the DNA register law, 
this would be contrary to the DNA profile law and Article 8 ECHR.102
Both cases demonstrate that genetic information is currently strin-
gently protected and authorities must meet a high burden to gain access. 
The cases illustrate the balancing of several public interests: the safe 
retention of health data, the resolution of violent crime and trust in 
healthcare. It thus seems that, for now, genetic data held in biobanks 
will only be provided to police in strictly limited situations that justify 
limiting the individual’s rights under Article 8 ECHR.103 However, as the 
European Court of Human Rights observed, technology will advance 
and we must be mindful of the potential for future misuse:
… bearing in mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and 
information technology, the Court cannot discount the possibility that in the 
future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be 
100 U.2017.1092Ø – TfK 2017.241.
101 Lov om oprettelse af et centralt dna-profilregister, nr. 434, 31 May 2000.
102 The central DNA register may only record information that is of police significance in 
connection with personal identification, not genetic information related to hereditary 
illness.
103 Samples have been transmitted from biobanks to the police in limited circumstances: 
to identify victims, and in one case to test against DNA found on a perpetrator, where 
no corpse was found. Det Etiske Råd, Et DNA-profil-register, som omfatter alle 
borgere i Danmark? Etiske overvejelser, 2006.
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adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated with 
precision today.104
The debate around the amendment highlighted that, in some extreme 
situations, the police may be able to access the data held in the Genome 
Centre and other biobanks. Even if a patient opts-out of further use of 
her data for research, she must also ask the Genome Centre, and any 
other biobanks, to destroy the samples.105 Otherwise, even if one has 
opted out, biological samples could potentially be transmitted to the 
police in certain instances. Yet, even if an individual takes all possible 
steps, the police may still be able to find a match if the data of close rela-
tives, such as parents, siblings or children, is located. For instance, in the 
United States, suspects are increasingly identified through genetic data 
uploaded by relatives.106 This only serves to highlight the interconnection 
between the individual and the collective, and the value of a solidarity 
approach, provided it offers adequate safeguards.
In line with the solidarity model, Danish legislation limits the actors 
and circumstances under which genetic data can be accessed. While 
researchers can be granted access to health and genetic data, this is 
increasingly subject to research ethics approval, which must safeguard 
the right to private life and ensure proportionate societal benefits. In the 
coming years, the use of genetic data in criminal investigations may take 
on increased significance as seen in other jurisdictions. While privacy is 
not absolute, it is vital that procedural safeguards are in place to ensure 
that any harms suffered by the individual are proportionate to the poten-
tial benefits to the collective.107 For now, however, access to genetic data 
is strictly limited and will not be liberalised by the establishment of the 
National Genome Centre.
104 See note 99, para. 71.
105 Sundhedsloven, § 33, § 34.
106 Ram, N., Guerrini, CJ., McGuire, AL., Genealogy databases and the future of 
criminal investigation, Genetics and Privacy, Vol. 360, nr. 6393, pp. 1078–1079, 2018.
107 See further, Knoppers BM., & Thorogood, AM., Ethics and Big Data in Health, 
Current Opinion in Systems Biology, Vol. 4 pp. 53–57, 2017.
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5. Evaluation of the Model
For solidarity to apply to the Danish presumed consent model, the 
following conditions must be met: transparency, veracity, and protec-
tion from harms associated with participation. The above discussion 
has highlighted several aspects that do not meet these requirements. 
Patients are inconsistently informed of the system of presumed consent, 
and potential uses of their data. Vulnerable groups, including children 
and persons without capacity to consent are included in the presumed 
consent model, and can only be excluded if a substituted decision-maker 
opts out on their behalf. In this section, I propose how the legislation 
could be improved to remedy these shortcomings.
Ultimately, the majority of the Danish population may wish to con-
tribute to research, as some argue, but we cannot know this without more 
evidence. An opt-out system relies on a presumption that the majority, if 
asked, would wish to contribute, and that those who feel strongly enough 
will opt out. Currently, limited available statistics indicate that most 
Danish residents neither know of the Register nor that their samples 
can be processed for research without express consent. By 2011, only 186 
individuals had registered on the opt-out registry.108 During the debates 
on the Genome Centre, the Ministry of Health acknowledged the 
knowledge gap and committed to increasing awareness.109 Yet, instead 
of remedying the lack of information, the amendment creates a parallel 
system of genetic exceptionalism.
The Ministry has regrettably not justified the presumed consent 
model. For example, the Danish Ethical Council recommends an ethical 
checklist, whereby health authorities should consider the evidence for the 
need for the type of intervention, review less restrictive alternatives and 
reflect on the positive effects vis-a-vis the negative impacts.110 The role 
of scientific research, and the possible implications for individuals, are 
worthy of greater public acknowledgment and discussion, as recognised 
108 Vaaben, L., Statens vævsregister stort set ukendt for borgerne, 1 April 2011, available 
at: https://www.etik.dk/etik/statens-v%C3%A6vsregister-stort-set-ukendt-borgerne.
109 See further, note 22.
110 Det Etiske Råd, Et venligt skub? p. 12–13, 2016.
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in the UNESCO International Declaration on Human Genetic Data.111 
The government should therefore expand the new obligation to inform 
to include any patient providing a biological sample. This will increase 
patient awareness regarding the “incidental research subject” and the 
opportunity to take part in research.
The manner in which patients should be informed also requires reflec-
tion. If the majority of patients genuinely wish to opt-out, this should be 
respected. However, if the act of opting out is based on misunderstanding 
or incomplete information, it may not reflect a genuine choice. Nord-
falk and Hoeyer have argued in relation to a separate opt-out to regis-
ter-based research that, due to the inadequate phrasing, many did not 
understand the implications of opting out. Others had been registered 
by their parents as minors, of which they did not become aware when 
they reached adulthood.112 The opt-out was removed after register-based 
research became unfeasible due to approximately 900,000 opt-outs. 
Therefore, the Ministry for Health must reflect on how best to increase 
knowledge for all patients. While the culture of trust in Denmark may 
help to justify presumed consent, it should not be exploited. Otherwise, 
the government may experience, as in the case of Iceland, that increased 
awareness will lead to a high level of opt outs, rendering presumed con-
sent unfeasible.113
Perhaps technological solutions for greater patient involvement could 
offer an answer. For instance, through an app, patients could be provided 
with an opportunity to specify to which studies they wish to contribute, 
similar to the different options regarding organ donation. This could 
include offering examples of previous research projects that have used 
111 States should endeavour to involve society at large in the decision-making process 
concerning broad policies for the collection, processing, use and storage of human 
genetic data and human proteomic data and the evaluation of their management, in 
particular in the case of population-based genetic studies. (Article 6(a), UNESCO 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (16 October 2003), SHS/
BIO/04/1).
112 Nordfalk F., & Hoeyer K., The rise and fall of an opt-out system, Scandinavian 
Journal of Public Health, Vol. 1, p. 1–5, 2017.
113 For a detailed analysis of the Icelandic experience with presumed consent, see, 
Winickoff DE., Genome and Nation Iceland’s Health Sector Database and its Legacy, 
Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, Vol. 1, Issue 2, pp. 80–105, 
2006.
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data from incidental research subjects, and introducing patients to the 
work of Research Ethics Committees. The incidental research subject 
could be informed that her data has contributed to research through a 
brief abstract of the research project and its results. This could encourage 
ownership and awareness of societal contributions. It would also be in 
line with a Council of Europe Recommendation on research on biolog-
ical materials of human origin, which calls on states to facilitate public 
access to general information on research collections and on conditions 
for obtaining, storage and use of biological materials for research pur-
poses.114 Minors should be informed when they come of age that their 
samples are being stored and reminded of the opportunity to opt-out.115
The rights of children and persons with potential difficulties to consent 
have not been given adequate attention. Following the solidarity model, 
samples from biobanks, like the PKU bank and data from the National 
Genome Centre, should not be reused for research until or unless the 
patient has capacity to willingly participate, i.e. they can legally opt-out. 
But is the opt-out truly the issue or is substituted consent the prob-
lem? In other words, if a parent/ guardian can consent to their child’s 
genome being sequenced for treatment, is this any less problematic than 
a parent/guardian opting out on their behalf? Should substituted deci-
sion makers be permitted to make these decisions? I find it incoherent to 
conclude that parents/guardians cannot practice solidarity on another’s 
behalf but can consent on another’s behalf. I therefore consider the big-
ger question to be: under what circumstances should parents/guardians 
be empowered to consent to genetic sequencing on another’s behalf? It 
should be noted that Danish legislation imposes stricter standards on 
research projects that use data from persons who cannot consent, for 
example, clear benefits must be offered for the research subject or the 
114 Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on research on biological materials of human origin (Adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 11 May 2016 at the 1256th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), 
Article 8. See also, “individuals should be able to express preferences regarding the 
processing of their personal health data” (Recommendation of the OECD Council on 
Health Data Governance (The Next Generation of Health Reforms, OECD Health 
Ministerial Meeting, 17 January 2017)), recommendation 5(ii)(a)).
115 This would be in line with Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)6, Ibid., Article 12.5.
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patient group.116 The research ethics committee is as always bound to 
safeguard the child or individual’s private life.
The opt-out model ensures that researchers can access data that is 
representative of the population, not only the smaller segments who 
enrol in research projects. If persons with potential difficulties to consent 
are excluded from research and personalised medicine, this may bring 
discriminatory results. In particular, personalised medicine for persons 
with psychiatric illnesses may be endangered, despite being a focus of 
the government’s strategy.117 Some research may only be possible with 
the participation of certain patient groups. Automatically excluding 
children and persons who cannot consent from research may therefore 
be contrary to children’s best interests and patients’ right to health.118
The ethical and legal position of persons who cannot consent needs 
discussion and analysis. It is problematic that neither the legislative nor 
political process has considered these ethical dilemmas. An analysis of the 
proportionality of including persons without capacity is needed, includ-
ing data on the societal significance of these types of research projects and 
whether other models are feasible. Besides increased information provi-
sion for substituted decision makers, greater efforts should be made to 
foster participation of children and persons without capacity to consent. 
Other questions must be addressed, such as, under what circumstances 
genetic testing is appropriate for minors (including new-borns), and to 
what findings children (and their parents) are entitled.119
For most persons the immediate, direct burden of having one’s 
biological samples and data stored for future research is minimal. The 
re-use of data without consent is less trivial, however. Danish legisla-
tion and policies on personalised medicine do not provide the necessary 
safeguards and thereby do not presently offer a suitable structure for 
solidarity-based governance.
116 Komitéloven, § 19.
117 Strategy, see note 1, p. 11.
118 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3.
119 See, for example, Ormond, KE., & Cho, MK., Translating personalized medicine 
using new genetic technologies in clinical practice: the ethical issues, Pers. Med., 
Vol. 11, Nr. 2, pp. 211–222, 2014.
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6. Conclusion: Minorities and Solidarity
As more countries contemplate introducing personalised medicine, 
Denmark’s experience can serve as guidance. Firstly, the law-making 
process underscores the need for consultation, clarity and communica-
tion. Secondly, the shortcomings of the legislation highlight the necessity 
of transparency, regardless of whether presumed or informed consent 
is enacted. Information while not a panacea – for one health literacy 
varies – is vital as long as self-determination remains a dominant norm 
in healthcare.120 Thirdly, law is a tool for creating adequate safeguards, 
namely comprehensive protection of privacy and anti-discrimination 
legislation. Fourthly, the position of vulnerable groups, like children and 
persons with disabilities, requires consideration, including through pub-
lic consultation. A more robust legislative and policy framework must be 
developed that addresses the pressing ethical and legal gaps.
Finally, it is worth reflecting on another question raised by Prainsack 
and Buyx, namely, solidarity with whom? Should solidarity-based per-
sonalised medicine only exist within the borders of the state, which is 
currently the focal point of healthcare, or should solidarity also contribute 
to shaping a more just world? There is some recognition that data sharing 
should facilitate better health outcomes for all. For example, the ethos 
of the GDPR – safe and rapid sharing of data within the EU – reflects 
this outlook.121 International human rights law also encourages states 
to cooperate to realise the highest attainable standard of health beyond 
their own borders, while the UNESCO Declaration on the Human 
Genome calls for states to assist developing countries to carry out and 
benefit from research in genetics.122 The International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data states that benefits should be shared with society 
120 Rothstein MA., Some Lingering Concerns about the Precision Medicine Initiative: 
Currents in Contemporary Bioethics, Journal of Law and Medical Ethics, Vol 44, Nr. 
3, pp. 520–5, 2016, p. 522.
121 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) OJ., Vol. L119, 4 May 2016, pp. 1–88, Article 1.
122 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, Article 2; 
UNESCO, Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Article 19.
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as a whole and the international community.123 Drawing on the right to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, Knoppers and others argue for “a 
human rights approach to an international code of conduct for genomic 
and clinical data sharing”.124
Yet, in Denmark, personalised medicine has been primarily framed as 
a national endeavour. Although the Action Plan and Strategy note the 
importance of international cooperation, the parliamentary debates of 
the 2018 amendment emphasise that personalised medicine is for the 
benefit of Danes. The debates reflect fears of genomic data being sent 
abroad,125 with the National Genome Centre framed as an antidote: 
a national infrastructure that avoids biological material and personal 
data being sent outside of Denmark.126 This reflects an inward-looking 
worldview: Denmark as safe, while abroad as dangerous.
Meanwhile, the current government is openly hostile towards 
non-Western immigrants, introducing laws and policies aimed at lim-
iting their access to public benefits.127 Danish homogeny is in fact often 
lauded as a resource that should be harnessed.128 These aspects may leave 
123 International Declaration, note 111, Article 19(a).
124 Knoppers, B., A human rights approach to an international code of conduct for 
genomic and clinical data sharing, Human Genetics, Vol. 133, pp. 895–903, 2014.
125 One of the questions asked during the debate was whether Danes’ genetic infor-
mation will be sent abroad without being informed, and if so, whether the data 
processors abroad would be inspected. (Sundheds- og Ældreudvalget 2017–18, L 146 
endeligt svar på spørgsmål 1, 13 April 2018).
126 Sundheds- og Ældreudvalget 2017–18 L 146 endeligt svar på spørgsmål 60, 13 April 
2018.
127 In the 2015 general election, the Danish People’s Party won 37 out of 179 seats (up 15 
from 2011). The party is opposed to immigration: “Denmark is not an immigration 
country… we will not accept a multiethnic transformation… Denmark is the 
Danes’ land”. See, Danish People’s Party, Principprogram, available at: https://
danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/ See for example, Sundhedsloven, § 50(1) 
[Since 2018, persons living in Denmark for over 3 years must pay for interpretation 
in healthcare]; Regeringen, Ét Danmark uden parallelsamfund – Ingen ghettoer i 
2030, marts 2018. [In 2018 the government launched the so-called “ghettoplan”, 
which recommends higher penalties for crimes committed in designated locations, 
obligatory day-care for children aged 1 living in certain locations].
128 See for example, Innovationsfonden, Sundhed: Investeringsstrategi for Innova-
tionsfonden 2016–2018. “Danmarks CPR-registrering og homogene befolkning 
kombineret med høj faglighed i sundhedsvæsenet og patienternes tillid giver unikke 
muligheder for at kunne følge forebyggelse og behandling af individuelle patienter 
gennem hele livet.” (p. 6).
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minority ethnic groups questioning whether they are only to contrib-
ute, but not benefit from personalised medicine. The question of how 
residents and citizens who diverge from the infamous “homogeneity” 
of Danish society will be included and excluded from the government’s 
ambitions for personalised medicine is yet to be addressed.129 But without 
legal certainty and adequate protections, minorities may decide against 
participation. This is problematic for a universal healthcare system and 
may increase already existing health disparities.130
129 Persons from non-Danish backgrounds would not fit within the Danish Reference 
Genome, which has been developed for use in the Danish healthcare system. Maretty, 
L., Sequencing and de novo assembly of 150 genomes from Denmark as a population 
reference, Nature Vol. 548, pp. 87–91, 2017.
130 Most personalized medicine studies focus on populations of European descent, see, 
Brothers and Rothstein, see note 5, p. 46.

